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Humanities, Warsaw, Poland
According to the dual-process theoretical perspective adopted in the presented
research, the efficiency of deliberative processes in decision making declines with age,
but experiential processes are relatively well-preserved. The age-related differences in
deliberative and experiential processes in risky decision-making were examined in this
research by applying the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART). We analyzed the influence
of age on risk acceptance and decision-making performance in two age groups of
female participants (younger adults, n = 81; older adults, n = 76), with additional
experimental manipulation of initial risk perception. We predicted and confirmed that
aging significantly worsens performance on the behavioral BART measures due to
age-related decline in deliberative processes. Older participants were found to exhibit
significantly higher risk aversion and lower BART performance, and the effect of age was
mediated by cognitive (processing speed) and motivational (need for cognitive closure)
mechanisms. Moreover, older adults adapt to the initial failure (vs. success) similarly,
as younger adults due to preserved efficiency of experiential processes. These results
suggest future directions for minimizing negative effects of aging in risky decision-making
and indicate compensatory processes, which are preserved during aging.
Keywords: aging, risk taking, BART, initial risk perception, processing speed, need for cognitive closure
INTRODUCTION
The common understanding is that young people are prone to risk taking, while older adults are
used as examples of caution and risk aversion (Rolison et al., 2012). However, those stereotypes do
not find support in numerous research results and correlational data (Dror et al., 1998; Chou et al.,
2007; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011). Many data indicate the opposite tendency: people aged 55 years
or more are actively making investment choices that involve large amounts of risk acceptance
(Brown, 2002), and they also occupy the highest-ranking managerial positions among S&P 500
companies (Statistic Brain Research Institute, 2015).
Some researchers (Chaubey, 1974; Deakin et al., 2004) hypothesize gradual age-related decline
in quality of functioning within risk and uncertainty conditions, which in turn leads to deficits in
decision-making efficiency. However, other psychological scientists do not agree with this notion
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and report evidence that not only supports no differences
between the quality of older and younger adults’ choices in risk
and uncertainty conditions (Dror et al., 1998), but also claims that
these groups are characterized by similar decision strategies when
faced with risky choices (Kovalchik et al., 2005; Bruine de Bruin
et al., 2014).
Because the issue of age differences in risky choice is a very
complex one, an increasing amount of research is focused on
specifying decision task contexts and settings that determine
whether older adults seek or avoid risk (for recent reviews,
see Henninger et al., 2010; Mata et al., 2011; Cavanagh et al.,
2012). We applied the dual-process perspective of age effects
on decision-making, recently elaborated by Hess (2015), for
a contextual theoretical model. Classical dual-process models
(e.g., Bargh, 1994; Epstein, 1994; Kahneman, 2003) differentiate
the deliberative processes (effortful, analytical, often verbal, and
slow) from the experiential processes (automatic, associative,
often affective, and fast). This distinction is important because
the empirical evidence (for reviews, see Peters et al., 2007; Hess,
2015) shows that in decision-making, deliberative processes are
impaired by aging, but experiential processes are relatively well-
preserved. In this research, we examined age-related differences
between deliberative and experiential processes in risky decision-
making by applying the Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART; Lejuez
et al., 2002). Meta-analysis by Mata et al. (2011) indicates that
risky tasks such as the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), the Behavioral
Investment Allocation Strategy (BIAS), and the BART, which
involve making decisions from experience (i.e., risk information
is not explicitly presented; participants estimate risk in a number
of trials), showed strikingly different age-related differences.
More specifically, in the IGT and BIAS, older adults, rather
than younger ones, were more risk-seeking. In contrast, in the
BART, older adults were more risk-averse than their younger
counterparts.
Therefore, the BART might be currently assessed as the
“prototype” task in which older adults prefer risk-avoiding
strategies. However, the research on age-related differences in
the BART are scarce, and we identified only two studies that
directly compared differences between older and younger adults.
They yielded only partially consistent findings. The research
by Henninger et al. (2010) demonstrated clear age-related
impairments in the main behavioral measures (i.e., adjusted
number of pumps and number of explosions) in the BART.
However, in the research by Rolison et al. (2012), age-related
differences in behavioral measures were absent, but the cognitive
modeling showed some subtle differences (older adults were
more cautious) in the initial perceptions of risk. Obviously, more
research is needed to examine the mechanisms of age-related
differences in the BART. The first goal of our research was
to understand how age-related decline in cognitive deliberative
skill, such as processing speed, affects BART performance. The
second goal was to examine whether older adults show a relative
preservation of experiential processes (affective resilience, Peters
et al., 2007; Hess, 2015) and are as adaptive as younger adults
in adjusting to a series of incidental failures in the BART. In
the next sections, the BART will be succinctly presented; we will
then review the existing evidence of age-related differences in
deliberative and experiential processes to predict their roles in the
relationship between age and BART performance.
Using the computerized BART, participants are to pump a
series of virtual balloons, and with each pump, points are gained.
Participants decide whether to continue or stop pumping and
indicate this by clicking on a button on the monitor. If pumping
is terminated, the points gained in that trial will be securely stored
in a “bank.” Pumping the balloon too many times carries the risk
of the balloon exploding, and the points gained in that trial are
lost. However, if the balloon is not pumped enough, the amount
of points earned is small. Therefore, risk taking is rewarded only
to a certain point, and then it is penalized. This is a reflection of
numerous real-life situations.
The BART has been proven to have strong ecological validity
because it is a strong predictor of real-life risk taking behavior in
a number of populations (Lejuez et al., 2003; Aklin et al., 2005;
Hopko et al., 2006; Bornovalova et al., 2009), including older
adults (Henninger et al., 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2012; Rolison
et al., 2012; Seaman et al., 2015). Lejuez et al. (2002) claimed that
the BART is sometimes a more reliable measure of risk-taking
behavior than self-reports and demographic data. According
to a meta-analysis involving the BART (Lauriola et al., 2014),
most publications demonstrated significant correlations between
the average adjusted number of pumps and risky behaviors in
real life, such as smoking, alcohol and drug use, aggression,
participation in unprotected sex, and gambling.
Age-related limitations in deliberative cognitive processes
might be plausible mechanisms of impaired BART performance
among older adults. When confronted with complex risky
decision tasks such as the BART, effective functioning of
participants demands active deliberation, such as counting
and averaging the number of pumps across trials, suppressing
negative feelings caused by balloon explosions, and weighing
the pros and cons of further pumping. Hence, there are high
demands on cognitive and attentional resources when it comes
to effective BART performance. The scientific literature (Engle
et al., 2005; Thornton and Dumke, 2005; Salthouse, 2006, 2012;
Sedek et al., 2013), indicates a clear and marked monotonic
decrease in basic fluid cognitive abilities (such as processing
speed, working memory capacity, and fluid intelligence) from
early adulthood through middle age to old age, and this is
responsible for decreased performance in various cognitive tasks.
The processing speed theory developed by Salthouse (1996) and
using the Digit Symbol Substitution Test (DSST) as a principal
measure, accounts for age-related changes, such as impairment
in logical reasoning (Salthouse, 2001; Sedek and von Hecker,
2004), in many cognitive tasks. Using the BART, Henninger
et al. (2010) found that older adults have greater aversion to risk
than younger adults, thus the quality of their decision-making
in that task was significantly lower. In addition, they showed
that age-related differences in BART performance are mediated
by processing speed. However, cognitive speed was measured
using the Digit Symbol test, which is similar to the DSST but has
some different characteristics. The processing speed theory (with
DSST as a principal measure) developed by Salthouse (1996)
accounts for age-related differences in many cognitive tasks.
According to this theory, slower speed of executing cognitive
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operations in older age impairs performance in more complex
tasks because of two mechanisms. The key defining feature of
the first mechanism (the “time limited” mechanism) is that
time constraints cause processing of the initial information to
be incomplete and defective. This is in contrast to the second
mechanism (the “simultaneity” mechanism) in which processing
the initial information is complete but decay causes it to become
unavailable in the later stages of processing. Both cognitive
mechanisms may be responsible for age-related decline in BART
performance. Hence, to replicate and extend previous findings
about the influence of age on BART performance (Henninger
et al., 2010), the DSST was included as a measure of processing
speed.
Another way in which older adults appear to manage
lower efficiency in deliberative cognitive processes is through
selective engagement in cognitive resources. Older adults may
conserve resources by simplifying their interactions with the
environment and by limiting both the quantity and complexity
of the information to which they attend. This description is
based on the classical framework of selection, optimization, and
compensation (SOC; Baltes and Baltes, 1990). According to Hess
(2000, 2014, 2015), aging is connected with increasing costs of
engagement in effortful cognitive activities. As aging proceeds,
more resources are necessary to achieve a particular level of
performance in an effortful task. Furthermore, a perception
of costs results in lack of intrinsic motivation to commit
resources to cognitively demanding tasks, and this in turn is
reflected in the selection processes of directing and energizing.
We measured cognitive motivation by applying the Need for
Cognitive Closure Short Scale (NFCC; Kruglanski, 2004). The
need for closure has been defined as a desire for a definite answer
to a question or for any firm answer rather than uncertainty,
confusion, or ambiguity (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996). Aging
usually increases scores on the NFCC; however, age effects have
varied size effect and are divergent for the different subscales
(Blanchard-Fields et al., 2001; Cornelis et al., 2009; Kossowska
et al., 2012b). The most consistent age effects are observed for
two NFCC subscales: Desire for Predictability and Preference
for Order and Structure (Blanchard-Fields et al., 2001; Czarnek
et al., 2015). Most previous research has demonstrated that the
NFCC is related to a simplified cognitive process involved in
decision-making, a limited information search, and a preference
for clear and unambiguous judgment (see the recent review
in Roets et al., 2015). Several authors (Cornelis et al., 2009;
Kossowska et al., 2012b; Roets et al., 2015) suggested the
interplay between age-related decline in deliberative processes
and age-related increase in the NFCC. Namely, the complexity
of encountered tasks in real-world situations often exceeds the
cognitive resources of older adults, and this corresponds to the
age-related increase in some of the NFCC subscales measuring
epistemic motivation (i.e., they are motivated to strive for
simplification, more predictability, and order). Our recent study
(Czarnek et al., 2015) showed some support for the double
mediation of age effect on stereotypic judgments by cognitive
and motivational processes. Namely, we found that, compared
to younger participants, older adults were more likely to rely on
stereotypic inferences when they read a story about out-group
members. In addition, the findings showed that making more
stereotypical inferences by older vs. younger adults in relation
to out-group members was mediated by cognitive (Trail Making
Test) and motivational (NFCC) mechanisms. The important
research question is whether the influence of aging on some
measures of the BART is also independently determined by a
decline in mental speed and an increase in the NFCC.
Recent findings (e.g., Queen and Hess, 2010; Hess et al., 2012)
and reviews (Peters et al., 2007; Hess and Ennis, 2014; Hess, 2015)
showed that age-related differences in decision making tasks are
eliminated when decision making performance strongly relies on
experiential (e.g., affective) processes. Interestingly, a substantial
number of studies on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994), reflecting the
activity of affective cortical structures, did not demonstrate age-
related differences (e.g., MacPherson et al., 2002; Kovalchik et al.,
2005; Wood et al., 2005; but see clear age-related differences in
Denburg et al., 2009). The most inspiring for us were the detailed
analyses of age-related differences found by Wood et al. (2005).
They found that younger adults applied both deliberative and
experiential processes in forming their choices between more-
and less-risky card decks in the IGT. However, older adults’
choice behaviors were guided more by recent losses and gains,
suggesting greater employment of experiential processes. This
strategy was quite effective in this study because both older and
younger adults performed similarly in the IGT.
Inspired by these analyses of the IGT by Wood et al. (2005),
we decided to experimentally manipulate experienced failures
and successes in preliminary trials of the BART. Specifically,
we procedurally increased the participant’s initial failures (the
first three balloons in the task explode almost immediately,
and participants hardly earn any points) or initial successes
(the first three balloons in the task explode after more than
20 pumps, hence participants earned a lot of points). As seen
by Wood and associates, such manipulation should be guided
by experiential processes and affect in both younger and older
participants similarly. According to recent research applying
advanced cognitive modeling to explain age-related differences in
BART performance (Cavanagh et al., 2012; Rolison et al., 2012),
such manipulation should initially significantly differentiate
adopted decision strategies (more cautious after initial failures,
more risky after initial successes), but this effect should be of short
duration (with increased experience).
The impact of experiential processes in BART performance
is related to the potential role of positive emotions in
explaining age-related differences in decision-making. Improved
affective experience has been found to be associated with aging
(Carstensen, 2006; Charles and Carstensen, 2010; Sedek et al.,
2014). Moreover, studies show that affect influences search
tendencies and therefore, decision-making. As an important
example, increased positive mood among older adults leads to
less information search in sequential choice tasks (von Helversen
and Mata, 2012), thereby worsening performance. Because the
BART is undoubtedly a sequential decision-making task, we also
examined whether positive affect influences BART performance.
In the BART, women tend to pump the balloon substantially
less than men (Lejuez et al., 2002). To eliminate complex
interactions that may be evoked by the unexpected influence of
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participants’ sex, we decided to conduct this study using a group
of only women, those commonly regarded as more risk averse
than men.
To succinctly summarize our main predictions: (1) Aging
significantly worsens performance on behavioral BART measures
because of age-related decline in deliberative processes; (2)
Experiencing incidental failures (vs. successes) at the beginning
of the task affects BART performance (at least in the first phase
of the task). However, older and younger adults should adapt
similarly to this manipulation because of preserved efficiency of
experiential processes.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
One-hundred fifty-eight female participants from two specific
age groups were invited to participate in the study. The group
of younger adults consisted of 81 students aged 18–23 years
(M = 19.86 years; SD = 1.00) recruited from first- and second-
year university courses in exchange for partial credit. The
group of older adults included 77 participants aged 65–80 years
(M = 69.19 years; SD = 4.32) who volunteered to participate
through a recruitment company. Participants who performed
best on the BART received material prizes, namely optional books
or shopping vouchers of the equal nominal value of $12.
Inclusion criteria were possession of a basic level of computer
literacy, allowing for comfortable and free performance of the
computerized task and use of corrective lenses (either eyeglasses
or contact lenses) when vision defects warranted it so that effects
of poor vision were minimized.
Information about education level in terms of the years of
formal education completed was participant-provided, and no
significant differences were found between the groups. Among
the older adults, mean (SD) level of education was 13.43 (3.06)
years, whereas among the younger adults, it was 13.59 (2.05) years
(F < 1).
Cognitive, Motivational, and Affective
Measures
Mental speed was measured using the DSST (Wechsler, 1981), a
classical measure of processing speed that involves substitution of
digits with symbols according to a given template within a time
limit.
An additional measure of the ability to engage in effortful
inference processes and avoid judgment biases was determined
by applying the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005),
a three-item measure (e.g., “a bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total; the
bat costs $1.00 more than the ball; how much does the ball cost?”).
The NFCC (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996) was measured
using the Polish version (Kossowska et al., 2012a). Participants
were asked to rate themselves on 15 items describing various
real-life situations using a Likert scale ranging from 1 (totally
disagree) to 6 (totally agree). Additionally, the Polish version
(Fajkowska and Marszał-Wis´niewska, 2009) of the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule – Expanded Form (PANAS-X; Watson
and Clark, 1994) was applied to measure current affective state.
The instrument consisted of 40 affective words (such as lonely,
concentrated, and happy) and participants rated how well each
item described their current mood on a seven-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Positive and negative affect
scores were calculated by taking the mean rating of either positive
or negative items.
Balloon Analog Risk Task
To measure risky behavior, a version of the BART (Lejuez et al.,
2002) programmed in Java Script language (interface shown in
Figure 1) was used. The task consisted of two series carried out
approximately 15 min apart. Each comprised 30 trials, and in
each trial, the participant was presented with a realistic picture of
a balloon on the computer monitor. The construction of BART
was the same as described in detail by Lejuez et al. (2002).
The series were most similar to yellow balloon series (Lejuez
et al., 2002) in which to maximize earnings participants should
learn to pump each balloon approximately 16 times, ignoring
the explosions. In our series, the average break point was 15 (30
trials with the explosions between 1 and 30 pumps); therefore,
to maximize earnings participants should learn to pump each
balloon approximately 15 times. The task was to virtually inflate
the balloon by clicking on the button on the monitor marked
‘PUMP’ and it was done in a self-paced manner. Each time this
was done, the balloon visually grew in size, and the participant
received one virtual point. At any time, the participant could stop
inflating the balloon and secure the points in a virtual bank. This
was done by clicking on a button marked ‘COLLECT.’ Each pump
increased the risk of losing all the points gained in the current
trial, but it did not affect points already secured in the bank. The
balloon would explode at a random point in time between the first
and thirtieth pumps (the maximum number of pumps was 30).
Experimental Manipulation of the BART
We experimentally modified the BART to influence the
participant’s initial failures or successes. The task included two
series requiring inflation of 30 balloons in each. The number of
pumps until a balloon exploded was randomized (trials with the
explosions between 1 and 30 pumps) except for the first three
trials, which were used for the experimental manipulation. These
three trials were either unlucky (explosions with pumps 3, 4,
and 1) or lucky (explosions with pumps 25, 27, and 28), and
participants received both series in a random order during the
course of the task. We used the two versions of random orders
for the trials (4–30) and these versions were counterbalanced
across participants for the series with the lucky and unlucky trials.
The effectiveness of this employed manipulation was confirmed
using within subjects analysis of variance, where the dependent
variable was the number of points earned in the first three trials
in two series (unlucky vs. lucky series): in the unlucky series,
participants earned M = 0.14 points (SD = 0.33), while in the
lucky series, participants earned M = 10.62 points (SD = 4.80),
F(1,157) = 746.48, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.826. The effectiveness of
this employed manipulation was additionally confirmed using
within subjects analysis of variance, where the dependent variable
was the percentage of explosions in the first three trials in two
series (unlucky vs. lucky series): in the unlucky series, 95% of
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FIGURE 1 | Balloon Analog Risk Task.
the first three balloons exploded, while in the lucky series, 6% of
the first three balloons exploded, F(1,157) = 3645.43, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.959.
Principal BART Measures
The BART provides various types of data that describe risk
tolerance and preferred decision-making strategies. We used
three primary measures to assess risk-taking behavior: adjusted
number of pumps, total points earned, and total number of
explosions. These measures were originally suggested by Lejuez
et al. (2002).
The most commonly used measure from the BART is the
adjusted number of pumps, calculated as the average number of
pumps on the balloons that did not explode. For the purpose
of statistical analysis, this is the most favorable variable because
incorporating all trials (including those in which the balloon
exploded) would result in using trials where participants did
not make their own decisions, but were forced to stop pumping
(Hunt et al., 2005). Thus, using the adjusted number of pumps
describes a relatively unbiased risk attitude (Seaman et al., 2015).
Making a deliberate decision to stop pumping is an example of a
non-punitive form of risk-taking behavior. On the contrary, the
total number of explosions represents the frequency of making
a decision that exceeded the optimal risk level and which was
followed by immediate punishment (explosion and loss of points;
Hunt et al., 2005).
The total number of points collected during both series
(excluding trials introduced for experimental manipulation) was
the final measure determined using the BART. This dependent
variable is often treated as an effectiveness index of decision-
making strategy because maximization of earnings requires
identifying the optimal level of risk. However, it is not a perfect
measure of risk propensity because identical earnings may be
gained both when a participant earns little for each balloon, but
causes few explosions and when she earns large but infrequent
reward, resulting in many explosions.
Despite the fact that each of these measures describes a
different aspect of decision-making under risk and uncertainty,
there is evidence they independently (in most experimental
procedures) produce similar findings (Lejuez et al., 2003).
Procedure
All participants gave informed consent for participation in
study procedures. Tests were completed in a room with 7–
9 other participants from the same age group, who were
simultaneously doing these tests in the same order. Each
participant was provided a desk so that paper-and-pencil
measures could be completed as well as a computer equipped
with the Windows 7 R© operating system and a 22-inch monitor.
Monitors were set in a way that prevented participants from
seeing other monitors and from communicating with one
another. Three experimenters were present at all times during
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study procedures, ensuring close and individual monitoring of
study participants.
The first series of the BART was completed using the
computer. Following this, the DSST, measuring mental speed
of processing information, was completed. Participants were
then instructed to complete the PANAS-X to self-report current
affective state. The NFCC and CRT were then completed.
Finally, the second series of the BART was completed. After all
participants finished the course of activities, those who scored
the most points on the BART in each group received a prize,
which was made explicit to participants prior to completion
of study procedures. The entire study took 30–50 min to
complete.
RESULTS
The effects of Age on processing speed, Cognitive Reflection Test,
Need for Cognitive Closure, and PANAS X Scale are summarized
in Table 1. Preliminary analyses showed that the Order of Series
(unlucky first, lucky first; between subjects variable) did not yield
any significant results as concern main effect and interaction
effects with any other variables for all dependent measures, hence
we omitted this variable in factorial design.
Risk Taking
As seen in previous studies, the principal measure of risk-taking
behavior using the BART was the adjusted number of pumps;
two additional measures were total points earned and number of
explosions.
A 2 × 2: (Age [younger adults, older adults] × First Trials
[unlucky, lucky; within subject variable]) mixed analysis of
variance (ANOVA) of these dependent measures yielded only the
main effects of Age (see Table 2) and the systematic main effect
of First Trials (see Table 3).
Results for the main effects of the Age variable clearly indicate
that older female adults adopt higher risk avoidance behavior
than younger female adults, performing worse on the BART
(average adjusted number of pumps was lower, fewer points
earned, lower number of explosions). The main effects of First
Trials consistently indicate that both older and younger female
adults adopted much riskier behavior in BART performance
when the first trials in the series were lucky (consequently
average adjusted number of pumps was higher, more points
earned, higher number of explosions) rather than when they were
unlucky.
Adaptations to Unlucky and Lucky Series
To determine in more detail the influence of introduced
experimental manipulation, we carried out a mixed model
ANOVA to compare the behaviors of participants immediately
after manipulation (at the beginning of the series), in the middle,
and at the end of the series. To accomplish this, an additional
within subject variable (Phase of Series) was created, and the
average adjusted number of pumps in in three subsequent phases
of nine trials following experimental manipulation (first phase:
trials 4–12; middle phase: trials 13–21; final phase: trials 22–30)
was determined.
A 2 × 2 × 3: (Age [younger adults, older adults] × First
Trials [unlucky, lucky; within subject variable] × Phase of Series
[first, middle, final; within subject variable]) mixed ANOVA of
the adjusted number of pumps in nine trials yielded two main
effects and one interaction effect.
A main effect of Age was found, F(1,154) = 16.60, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.097, showing that adjusted number of pumps was lower
in older adults (M = 7.87) than in younger adults (M = 9.64).
A main effect of First Trials was also found, F(1,154) = 100.82,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.396, showing that adjusted number of pumps
was lower when the unlucky series was presented (M= 7.76) than
when the lucky series was presented (M = 9.76).
The main effect of First Trials was qualified as significant
interaction effect, namely First Trials × Phase of Series,
F(1,154) = 42.95, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.218 (see Figure 2 – for
completeness, the age effect is included). As shown in Figure 2,
the adjusted number of pumps during the initially unlucky
series was lowest in the first phase and then gradually increased
(p < 0.05) in the subsequent phases. However, the adjusted
number of pumps in the initially lucky series was higher in the
first phase than in the other phases (p < 0.001) and similar in the
middle and final phases. At the beginning of a series, the adjusted
number of pumps was higher if the series was initially lucky than
if it was initially unlucky (η2p = 0.486). Those differences were
gradually decreasing (η2p = 0.149 in the middle phase; η2p = 0.114
TABLE 1 | Participant characteristics.
Measures Younger adults (N = 81F) Older adults (N = 77F) Statistical test
M SD M SD F p η2p
DSSTa 120.11 13.77 74.34 21.44 234.37 <0.001 0.616
CRT 1.00 1.04 0.58 0.70 8.67 0.004 0.053
NFCC_2 21.77 4.83 28.12 5.39 61.00 <0.001 0.281
PANAS-X Scale
General positive affect 31.89 6.40 35.88 6.55 15.02 <0.001 0.088
General negative affect 15.15 6.19 13.75 5.93 2.09 0.150 0.013
DSST, Digit Symbol Substitution Test; CRT, Cognitive Reflection Test; NFCC_2, sum of the two subscales of Need for Cognitive Closure (Desire for Predictability and
Preference for Order and Structure). aSample size for DSST was 71 for younger and 77 for older adults because data for this measure was not collected from 10 younger
adults because of experimenters’ omissions.
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TABLE 2 | Analysis of variance main effects of the Age variable on risk indicators in BART task (2 × 2 schema: Age × First Trials).
Measures Younger adults Older adults Statistical test
M SE M SE F p η2p
Adjusted number of pumps 8.77 0.23 7.18 0.24 23.07 <0.001 0.129
Total number of points 157.03 2.94 143.62 3.01 10.16 0.002 0.061
Total number of explosions experienced 9.35 0.41 7.23 0.42 12.88 <0.001 0.076
TABLE 3 | Analysis of variance main effects of First Trial variable on risk indicators in BART task (2 × 2 schema: Age × First Trials).
Measures Failure series Success series Statistical test
M SE M SE F p η2p
Adjusted number of pumps 7.25 0.18 8.70 0.19 76.31 <0.001 0.328
Total number of points 144.76 2.73 155.88 2.73 10.26 0.002 0.062
Total number of explosions experienced 7.14 0.30 9.45 0.34 76.25 <0.001 0.328
FIGURE 2 | Adjusted average number of pumps as a function of First Trials, Phase of Series, and Age. Error bars represent standard errors.
in the final phase). However, all the differences in the adjusted
number of pumps between lucky and unlucky series across all
phases were highly significant (p < 0.001).
Very similar results were found when we analyzed total
number of explosions experienced (and points earned) in the
first, middle, and final phases; therefore, we do not report these
results to avoid redundancy of information.
The age of the study participants does not statistically
significantly interact with any of the other variables. Therefore,
it can be concluded that aging does not result in significant
impairment on BART performance after incidental failure or
incidental success experience.
Mediating Mechanisms
Preliminary correlational analyses showed that only processing
speed (measured by DSST) and need for cognitive closure
(NFCC) were significantly correlated with BART measures
(Table 4); hence only those variables were considered
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 659
fpsyg-07-00659 May 3, 2016 Time: 14:12 # 8
Koscielniak et al. Effects of Age on BART
TABLE 4 | Correlation table of dependent, independent, and demographic variables.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
(1) adjPump –
(2) Earnings 0.639∗∗∗ –
(3) Explosions 0.913∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ –
(4) Age group −0.280∗∗∗ −0.247∗∗ −0.276∗∗∗ –
(5) DSST 0.361∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ −0.785∗∗∗ –
(6) CRT 0.086 0.058 0.072 −0.229∗∗ 0.210∗ –
(7) NFCC_2 −0.235∗∗ −0.044 −0.288∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ −0.369∗∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ –
(8) Positive affect −0.097 −0.035 −0.137 0.296∗∗∗ −0.231∗∗ −0.078 0.177∗ –
adjPump = Adjusted balloon pumps, average number of pumps’ Earnings = total points collected’ Explosions = number of balloon explosions experienced; Age
Group = Older Adults vs. Younger Adults; DSST = Digit Symbol Substitution Test; CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test; NFCC_2 = sum of the two subscales of NFCC (Desire
for Predictability, and Preference for Order and Structure); Positive and Negative Affect = PANAS-X scores. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
potential mediators in the relationship between age and
BART performance.
Results of the positive affect scale are statistically significantly
differentiated by age (Table 1), confirming the existence of a
positivity effect (Carstensen et al., 1999). However, positive affect
did not correlate with any measures determined by the BART
(Table 4). Similarly, the CRT (Frederick, 2005), assumed to
measure engagement in effortful inference processes, had higher
scores in the younger group (Table 1); however they, too, were
not correlated with BART measures (Table 4).
To verify the hypothesis that there is no direct relationship
between participant age and their behavior under risk and
uncertainty (after controlling for mechanisms explaining such
a relationship), a mediation analysis using Process software
(Hayes, 2013) was conducted. It is important to underline that
such mediation analyses are not seen at any rate as causal
developmental change but only as the examination of direct and
indirect influence of age differences on risky decision choice. As
described by Hayes and Scharkow (2013) for optimal tests of the
indirect effect in statistical mediation analysis, we applied the
recommended percentile bootstrap CI method. The DSST score
was the measure of processing speed of cognitive functioning, the
sum of the two NFCC subscales was the measure of motivation to
select incoming information.
The strongest mediator of the relationship between age
and risk acceptance measures is processing speed (NFCC was
reliable mediator only for number of explosions measure). In
Figure 3A, the mediation influence of these variables on the
relationship between age and adjusted number of pumps is
shown. Bootstrapping (n = 10000 bootstrap resamples, 95%
confidence intervals) revealed the significant indirect effect
of aging on risk-seeking via DSST (b2 × b3 = −1.86;
BootLLCI = −2,91; BootULCI = −0.84), while the direct effect
becomes statistically insignificant in this model (b1 = 0.80;
p= 0.29).
The mediation mechanism is shaped very similarly when
analyzing the influence of age on total score, expressed as
earned points (see Figure 3B), and yields analogous results:
an insignificant direct effect of age on the dependent variable
(b1 = 5.17; p = 0.73) and a strong mediation path via
processing speed (b2 × b3 = −35.26; BootLLCI = −58.41;
BootULCI = −13.44). These findings clearly demonstrate that
risk acceptance and effectiveness of choices made under risk and
uncertainty do not depend directly on age, but on the impairment
of cognitive functions, which are characteristic to aging.
This model is even more extensive when applied to
the relationship between age and the number of explosions
experienced in the BART. While a strong main effect of this
relationship is shown in Table 2, it becomes insignificant
(b1 = 1.16; p = 0.58) after introducing two mediating variables:
the processing speed of information and the need for closure
(see Figure 3C). The DSST is again a mediating factor
(b2 × b3 = −3.59; BootLLCI = −6,72; BootULCI = −0.41);
however, the scale of this mediation is additionally increased
by the NFCC (b4 × b5 = −1.63; BootLLCI = −3,28;
BootULCI = −0.08). A need for cognitive closure expresses
the epistemic motivation, which significantly increases with age,
resulting in more judicious pumping of balloons, thus resulting
in fewer explosions.
DISCUSSION
This study used the BART to investigate the influence of aging
on the specificity of decision-making under risk and uncertainty
among women. The primary result was a strong negative effect of
age on all decision-making aspects of the task, affecting both the
degree of risk tolerance and efficiency of performance. This agrees
with previous research findings on age-related limitations of
BART performance (Henninger et al., 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2012;
Rolison et al., 2012). More generally, these findings confirmed the
notion of Mata et al. (2011) that older adults demonstrate risk
aversion in the risky choice context in which risk-seeking would
be a more effective strategy.
The fact that incidental failures cause initial increases in
precaution similarly among younger and older adults may be
because it is a fairly common life experience, especially in the
context of consumer behavior. For instance, a batch of light bulbs
of a given brand may easily overheat. As a result, consumers may
react by automatically using caution when purchasing products
of that brand, but they may gradually and slowly change with
more positive experiences. It is in line with a number of studies
(Queen et al., 2012; Hess et al., 2013), which demonstrate that
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FIGURE 3 | Models depicting mediated effects of age differences via
processing speed (DSST) and Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC_2)
on: (A) adjusted number of pumps; (B) total points; (C) number of
explosions in BART experiment. Bold arrows indicate significant indirect
effects; dashed arrows indicate non-significant effects. Entries are
unstandardized regression coefficients with t-test values. ∗p < 0.05,
∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
age differences disappear in the domain of consumer behavior
regarding well-known products. It is therefore explained by
possessing life experiences and by well-preserved experiential
processes among older adults. Similarly, incidental successes
are usually followed by temporary increases toward more risky
behaviors. For example, in a recently published study conducted
in natural settings, it was found that after a basketball team’s
victory, residents of the town purchased substantially more
lottery tickets (Otto et al., 2016).
The Mediating Roles of Processing
Speed and Need for Cognitive Closure
Further analyses showed that processing speed (as measured by
the DSST) mediates age-related differences in the basic measures
of the BART: the adjusted number of pumps, the earned points,
and the number of explosions. The relationship between age
and explosions was also mediated (double-unrelated mediators)
by the need for closure measure (NFCC_2). These findings
confirmed the results of previous research (Henninger et al.,
2010), which used a different measure of processing speed.
Additionally, our analyses identified full mediations in terms
of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) classical mediation model: the
direct and strong effect of age on BART measures disappeared
when processing speed (and in case of explosions, also the need
for closure) was included in the mediation model. On a more
general level, these findings are consistent with the general role of
processing speed (Salthouse, 1996, 2001) as the mediator of the
relationship between age and performance of complex cognitive
tasks. More specifically, these findings agree with the results
described in many recent studies (e.g., Finucane et al., 2005; Mata
et al., 2007; Frey et al., 2015) – that processing speed and some
other cognitive variables (e.g., working memory) are important
mediators of age-related differences in complex decision-making
tasks.
The construct of the need for cognitive closure, which
increases with age, also deserves more applications in the domain
of aging and risky decision-making. Researchers emphasize its
importance at every stage of life (Roets et al., 2015); however,
it appears to be of special importance in older age. Individuals
with high NFCC are intolerant of confusion and uncertainty,
and therefore are inclined to make rapid decisions. On the
other hand, low-NFCC individuals are motivated to analyze
situations in a systematic manner, consider alternative options,
and make complex decisions (Kruglanski and Webster, 1996).
Most previous research has demonstrated that NFCC is related
to a simplified cognitive process involved in decision-making,
a limited information search, and a preference for clear and
unambiguous judgment. More importantly, it has shown that
high-NFCC individuals are characterized by fewer cognitive
resources that can be allocated to present activities (Kossowska,
2007; Kossowska et al., 2010). Thus, in our recent research
(Czarnek et al., 2015), we found that aging decreased processing
speed and cognitive flexibility as measured by the Trail Making
Test and increased NFCC (the same two NFCC subscales used
here) and that both factors mediate the relationship between
age and drawing stereotypical inferences about out-groups. In
this current study, we again found the double-mediation of a
cognitive factor (mental speed) and a motivation factor (need for
cognitive closure) of the relationship between age and the number
of explosions experienced during the BART. Further research is
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needed to elucidate the roles of both cognitive and motivational
mechanisms in age-related differences in risky choices.
The Role of Initial Risk Perception in the
BART
In-depth analyses provided more information on participants’
behaviors connected with the influence of incidental failure
experiences (three unlucky trials) on decision-making under
risk in the BART. A consistent pattern of results was acquired,
suggesting that study participants pump the balloon far
more boldly after a safe beginning than after experiencing
incidental failure. However, this influence gradually disappears
as experience is gained, and the effect of previously experienced
failure becomes weaker. Generally, this pattern of results is
partially consistent with the predictions of cognitive modeling
studies (Cavanagh et al., 2012; Rolison et al., 2012; Seaman
et al., 2015) that initial perceptions of high risk might impair
BART performance. The new and intriguing evidence is that
such manipulation of incidental failure is very strong and lasts
across the entire series. The additional advantage of this study
was that the strength of this effect was confirmed by experimental
manipulation.
This pattern of results does not differ statistically in both age
groups, supporting the existing hypotheses that older adults have
the ability to adapt their behavior to changing conditions (Queen
et al., 2012). Older women who were subjected to incidental
failures at the beginning were not only able to adjust their balloon
pumping strategies to further task conditions equally efficiently as
younger women, but also stabilized the number of pumps at the
very end to levels equaling those of participants subjected to lucky
beginnings. Maintaining such flexibility in decision-making is
undoubtedly an example of a mechanism compensating for some
cognitive limitations.
Limitations and Future Research
Extended replications and longitudinal paradigms are needed to
establish whether the double-mediation models (including both
cognitive and motivational variables) are reliable for the BART
and whether they could be extended to other risky decision
paradigms, such as the IGT, which showed opposite tendencies
in aging (cf. Mata et al., 2011). Also, it would be important to
determine whether experimental manipulation with incidental
failures (or successes) will replicate both very strong effects
and gradual adaptations in other risky choice paradigms and to
confirm the preserved ability of older adults to efficiently cope
with such incidental events. Moreover, it would be useful to
include affect measure of the PANAS X both at the beginning
and at the end of the study to check for possible influences
of the BART performance on the affective experience of study
participants in future research or at least to include it at the
very beginning of the study to avoid the influence of BART
performance on affect.
Lindenberger and Pötter (1998) underlined the limitations
of regression mediating models in providing a reliable account
of variance explained because of existing inter-correlations
between predictor variables. The primary problem is that
correlations between two variables that are each correlated with
age may result in a spurious relationship between the two
variables that does not reflect a true relationship. However,
there are some counter arguments against the possibility of
such spurious relationships in our analyses, showing that the
effects of age on BART measures are mediated by mental speed
(operationalized by the DSST). First, the zero-order correlations
between mental speed and BART (see Table 4) and relationships
between mental speed and BART in the mediation models (see
Figure 3) preserved their signs, values, and significance levels.
As demonstrated by Lindenberger and Pötter (1998), in case of
spurious correlations, zero-order correlations between mediator
and dependent variable may show completely different patterns
than appropriate relationships within mediation models. Second,
the zero-order correlations between mental speed and BART
measures were calculated separately for each age group. For the
older group, these correlations were substantial and significant
(at least p < 0.05) with the average number of pumps (r = 0.35),
the number of points (r = 0.29), and the number of explosions
(r = 0.30). However, these correlations were not significant
among the younger group. These patterns of correlations are
consistent with theoretical arguments that larger problems of
older adults (compared to younger adults) in BART performance
are associated with lowered mental speed. Generally, mediation
analyses using extreme age groups should be treated with
caution. However, Lindenberger and Pötter (1998) advised there
is nothing fundamentally wrong with using mediational analyses
to show direct and indirect effects of age groups on psychological
processes if there are sound theoretical arguments in favor of such
a path or structural models.
In future studies, it would be important to examine other
cognitive components (i.e., not only processing speed, but also
working memory spans; Engle et al., 1999) and other motivational
components as potential mediators of the relationship between
aging and risky decision-making. Examples are the Personal Need
for Structure and Need for Cognition (see Neuberg and Newsom,
1993; Cacioppo et al., 1996) and cardiovascular measures of
motivation (see Hess and Ennis, 2014).
It is important, in further studies, to collect reaction times. The
absence or presence of any age-related differences or interactions
may be confounded by different strategies. For example, if older
adults take much more time than younger adults to complete
the tasks, this would lead to different interpretation than if older
adults carried out the tasks very quickly.
The obvious limitations of this research are the cross-sectional
character of its design and lack of comparable male participants.
In some earlier experiments on risk preferences, researchers
proved that in accordance with common stereotypes men indeed
do prefer more risky strategies (including the determination
of neurological underpinnings of these preferences, e.g., Bolla
et al., 2004); while in other studies (including those which
use neuroimaging techniques), no such differences were found
(Galvan et al., 2007). d’Acremont and Van der Linden (2006)
showed that differences in risk preferences can be explained
by the choice of a specific experimental task, which seems to
confirm the thesis that these differences result more from the
context than biological bases (Cauffman et al., 2010). In earlier
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research using the BART procedure, greater risk aversion was
found among women (Lejuez et al., 2002); however, this did not
have a direct impact on the effectiveness of decisions that were
made. Moreover, neuronal differences in this respect were also
reported (Cazzell et al., 2012), which may be the result of different
rates of development of brain structures in the sexes. For these
reasons, we chose to focus exclusively on women. On one hand,
this could be considered a limitation, but on the other hand,
it eliminates possible distortions in the results by unspecified
gender differences.
CONCLUSION
In this study we applied the dual-process perspective of
age effects on decision making. According to this theoretical
perspective the influence of aging on decision making is
moderated by the type of processing demands (deliberative
vs. experiential). In line with predictions older participants
were found to exhibit significantly higher risk aversion and
lower BART performance (demanding deliberative processes)
compared to their younger counterparts, adding compelling
research evidence to the scarce number of studies of age effects
on BART. What is important and new in the domain of aging
and risky decision making, is that the effect of age on some
BART measures was mediated not only by cognitive (processing
speed) but also motivational (need for cognitive closure)
mechanisms. We also discovered, using original experimental
manipulation, that older and younger adults show similar pattern
of adaptations to the initial failure (vs. success), which is most
probably due to preserved efficiency of experiential processes in
older age.
The aging population faces new challenges that often require
making important risky decisions in unfamiliar circumstances.
This study provides new knowledge about mechanisms that
allow older adults to build, in a different (not necessarily worse)
way, their own strategy for functioning in risk and uncertainty
conditions. It turns out that in some cases, for instance when
experiencing incidental failure, older adults perform as well
as younger adults, which calls into question many existing
stereotypes. A better understanding of the mutual roles of
cognitive, motivational, and affective mechanisms (see: Peters
et al., 2011; Verhaeghen et al., 2012) may lead to greater
awareness among older adults of their advantages as well
as disadvantages and to formation of new training programs
preventing imperfect decision-making in late adulthood.
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